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While reductive materialist theories of mind are suscep
tible to devastating objections, it seems one cannot outright
deny some sort of genuine cormection between the mind"
and the brain. It is a fact that neurophysiology has enjoyed
significant empirical success; testimony to this fact can be
seen, for instance, in the pharmaceutical industry, where
drugs which affect the chemistry of the brain can be used to
alleviate numerous mental disorders. Nevertheless, in this
essay I will argue that the materialist thesis is problematic,
particularly at the linguistic level. I will then propose a model
which salvages some of the significant empirical insights
provided by neurophysiology, yet avoids the linguistic con
fusion of materialism proper by drastically curtailing the
neurophysiologist's role in understanding and explaining
"the mind".
/I

Materialism and Reduction
"Whenever a new science achieves its first big successes, its
enthusias.tic acolytes always fancy that all questions are now
soluble by extension of its methods of solving its questions"
(Ryle 76). On this model, the neurophysiologists claim that
questions about the mental states and events of humans and
other obviously conscious animals can be reduced to ques
tions about states and events of the brain and nervous sys
tem. This scientific stance finds its philosophical counterpart
in a cluster of views known broadly as "reductive material
ism" (which I shall simply call "materialism"). Accordingto
materialists, what we call lithe mental" is either identical
with, or entirely determined by, the physical. Typically,
physical" is meant to refer to the brain and nervous system,
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although many materialists believe that the mental can also
be realized by certain non-biological physical systems (for
instance, AI theorists hold that a sufficiently complex system
of silicon chips implementing a sufficiently complex com
puter program can be said to have Umental" properties and
capabilities). In any case, the materialists "wish to deny the
existence of any irred ucible mental phenomena in the world"
(Searle 27). Thus, both the neurophysiologists and the mate
rialists propose an explanatory reduction: the mental can be
explained solely in terms of the neurophysiological because
the mental is nothing over and above the neurophysiolo gical;
every "mental" state or event is reducible to some neuro
physiological correlate.
I characterize these views as "reductive" whether or not
they deny the existence of mental phenomena such as, most
significantly, consciousness. The existence of mental phe
nomena can be denied by such theories (Churchlandian
eliminative materialism being the most explicit and extreme
example), but it need not be. Materialists can hold that there
are such things as consciousness, imagination, beliefs,
desires, sensations, etc. However, the materialist position is
reductive in that for every mental particular, there is some
neurophysiological particular that is identical with, causes,
or otherwise wholly determines the nature of its correspond
ing mental particular. To give a complete neurophysiologi
cal story of a human being is to give a complete "mental"
story of that human being. The neurophysiologist's" aim is
to explain what thinking, perceiving, etc. are by reference to
the 'thinking' or interpreting', 'inferring' or 'hypothesizing',
allegedly engaged in by the brain and its parts (Hacker
149)...." Hence, there is an explanatory reduction (of the
mental to the neurophysiological).
I

Linguistic Objections

In Philosophical Investigatiol1s Wittgenstein makes the
follOWing point: "[O]nly of a living human being and what
resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it
L
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has sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or
unconscious (Wittgenstein 97)." This list could be extended
to include all of the vocabulary which refers to the mental,
including thinking, believing, desiring, remembering, the
various moods and emotions, etc.; all these words refer to
mental states and events. According to Wittgenstein, these
words are predicable only of human beings because we use
these words to refer to what human beings do, viz., perceive,
think, believe, etc1 : "[T]he criteria for the application of such
[words] consist in behaviour patterns in specific contexts
against a background of widely ramifying complex capaci
ties manifest in behaviour (Hacker 147)./1 We attribute the
various mental (viz., psychological) properties to persons (to
adopt Straws on's terminology) because only a person could
manifest the contextually situated behaviour which consti
tutes the criteria for attributing said properties.
The materialist claims that the psychological properties
of a person are entirely dependent upon, and thus can be
explained solely in reference to, that person's neurophysi
ological properties; the neurophysiological explanation is
said to be "basic". But this entails that the various psycho
logical predicates must be ascribed to physiological mecha
nisms, since they and nothing else are invoked in the expla
nation of the psychological property. The materialist is thus
bound to speak of brains thinking, imagining! being in pain!
seeing (in conjunction with the eyes), etc. At this point! the
materialist's explanation has become nonsensical. It makes
no sense to think of a brain exhibiting the criteria by which we
apply psychological predicates. A brain cannot cry out in
pain! express a belief, argue for an hypothesis, watch a
sunset, or read a book. This is not due to the obvious fact that
abrainhas neither a vocalnora visual apparatus; to the extent
that the brain is cited as the causal origin of all these activities,
it can be said to be what is acting, and hence is the bearer of
the psychological predicates. Yet it is these criteria alone
which enable us to say of a personthat she feels pain, believes,
thinks, sees, or understands written language. Since only
persons themselves can exhibit the criteria for ascribing
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psychological predicates, they must be presupposed in any
story of the psychological. The neurophysiological explana
tion, which talks on one hand about brains and on the other
about psychological attributes which these brains presum
ably manifest in various biochemical states and events, is not
merely incomplete; it is incoherent.
I have used scarce quotes when speaking about "the
mind" because there is a tendency to suppose that in denying
that one can attribute psychological predicates to neuro
physiological mechanisms, one is thereby committed to at
tributing them to "the mind". hnmediately one is con
fronted with the ontologically dubious entity made famous
by Descartes; indeed, it is the very absurdity of the notion of
a thinking, immaterial substance somehow inhering in and
animating a body which provides much of the impetus for
the more scientifically acceptable materialist explanation.
Denying materialism does not mean one must speak in terms
of "minds" in any more than a metaphorical sense; one can
simply talk about human beings or persons, entities which
cannot present any serious ontological uncertainty. Once
persons have been posited, one can simply proceed to at
tribute them psychological predicates of perceiving, believ
ing, etc., based simply on the fact that these are things that
persons (not their brains or "minds") do.
Brains Matter
Nevertheless, the materialist will insist that it is undeni
able that persons require brains. This, of course, is true.
Remove the brain from a person's head, and you no longer
have a living person; you are left with a corpse. But the
linguistic objection outlined above denies none of this; it is a
grammatical objection not an empirical one. In his exegesis of
Wittgenstein's Investigations, Hacker explains what this
means:
[W]e know what [psychological] verbs mean only in
so far as we have mastered their existing use, which
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does not license applying them to the body or its
parts, save derivatively .... [A] lthough neurological
complexity (crudely speaking) is empirically requi
site for possession of perceptuat volitional, and cog
nitive faculties, the kinds of features ... that underlie,
and constitute criteria for such faculties and their
exercise to a [person] are quite different from this.
(Hacker 148,162)
These criteria are what persons, not brains, do and say. But
just as it does not follow from accepting this that one must
deny that there is a mental process" ,it also does not follow
that one must posit an unbridgeable gulf between con
sciousness and brain-process" (Wittgenstein 1022,124).
The neuroscientist proposes an explanation which com
bines the terms, and hence the rules of use, from the person
story" and the "brain-story". This combination "produces a
conflict of rules and hence incoherence in the neuroscientists'
use of these terms" (Hacker 148-9). Hacker emphasizes that
the neuroscientist erroneously uses these terms, not that
there is anything wrong with these terms per se. Accordingly
he admits that the use of neurophysiological terminology in
explanations of psychological predicates could be a coherent
possibility, though not on the present model of such explanc'l
tions:
1/

1/

U

If neurophysiologists ... or philosophers wish to
change existing grammar, to introduce new ways of
speaking, they may do SOi but their new stipulations
must be explained and conditions of application laid
down. (Hacker 148)

I have no intention of introducing any "new ways of speak
ing", but I would like now to introduce and develop a
grammatical distinction which, I shall argue, picks up on the
ontological connection between the psychological and the
neurophysiological, a connection which all non-Cartesians
(Wittgenstein and Hacker included) seem willing to admit
exists at some level. The details of this grammatical distinc
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tion constitute the stipulations by which this ontological
connection can be explained. Although this might presently
sound like an attempt to vindicate the materialist position, I
am quite sure that those philosophers and scientists who
enthusiastically endorse neurophysiological explanation will
be less than satisfied with my conclusions.
Transitive and Intransitive Consciousness

Consciousness, according to Searle, lIis the central men
tal notion" (Searle 84). Furthermore, he argues that the
subjective, qualitative character of consciousness cannot,
even in principle, be accounted for by a purely objective
neurophysiological explanation. Searle is certainly correct in
emphasizing the importance of consciousness; any account
which cannot explain consciousness is grossly incomplete. I
shall assume for now that materialists do not wish to deny the
existence of consciousness, but believe (if falsely) that an
ideal neurophysiological explanation will be able to account
for consciousness. 3
There are two relevant senses of the word conscious
ness". Norman Malcolm provides a general picture of this
distinction:
/I

There is a grammatical difference between two uses
of the word'conscious'. In one use this word requires
an object: one is said to be conscious of something, or
to be conscious that so-and-so.... There is another use
of the word conscious' in which it does not take an
object. If we think that a person who was knocked
unconscious has regained consciousness, we can say,
'He is conscious', without needing to add an 'of' or a
'that'. (Armstrong & Malcolm 3)
I

Consciousness with an object is called" transitive conscious
ness", while the more generic sense of consciousness, in
which one either is or is not conscious or awake", regardless
of what one is conscious of or that, is called "intransitive
consciousness" .4
II
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Although the general idea should be obvious, there is
clearly more to be said about this distinction. It is particularly
helpful to note that there are numerous sorts of transitive
consciousness. I can be transitively conscious of, for instance,
stones, cats, the weather, and countless other things in the
physical world, via the senses; I can see a stone or smell a cat,
and by doing so I am conscious of the stone or the cat (or
perhaps the cat' s smell; the distinction is irrelevant here). I
can be conscious ofmyself or bits of myself; when I am in pain
because I have burnt my finger, I am conscious of my finger
in a particularly unpleasant (viz., painful) way.
Further types of transitive consciousness can be under~
stood by using different prepositions. In these cases, the
object of the preposition will be identical with the object of
consciousness. Thus, when thirsty (which perhaps involves,
among other things, consciousness of one's dry mouth), one
can have a desire for a glass of water. One can be attentive to
what a pontificating orator is saying; and one might be angry
at, or perhaps even in love with, the orator. In all these cases,
one is in one way or another conscious of something or
someone, i.e., transitively conscious.
Malcolm suggests that whatever we can be conscious of,
we can also be conscious that; for instance, I can be conscious
afsomeone playing the piano, and also conscious that some~
one is playing the piano. These may seem like the same thing,
but there is "a difference between a concept.free mental state
(e.g., an experience) and a concept-charged mental state (e.g.,
a belief)" (Dretske 263). In the above example, then, con
sciousness of someone playing the piano is, say, seeing a
person sitting at the piano and hearing certain sounds ema
nating from the instrument. Consciousness that someone is
a playing the piano, on the other hand, is a belief which
necessarily involves certain concepts, viz., concepts of pi
anos, music, and persons. An animal which lacks these
concepts cannot be conceptually conscious that a piano is
being played, but it can be conscious of the piano being
played (I.e., it can hear it).
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Dretske characterizes this distinction as one between
consciousness of facts and consciousness of things, but I
think that the more general and relevant distinction is be
tween conceptual and non-conceptual consciousness, and
that the word that best captures the nature of the more
conceptual forms of consciousness. Thus one can be said to
believe (veridically or not) that Santa Claus exists;
remember that one has to take the garbage out, or understand
that chat" means"cat" in French. Whatever the status of the
distinction between consciousness of and consciousness that,
it is clear that both are types of transitive consciousness,
viz., consciousness with an object.
Intransitive consciousness seems to be a far less complex
notion than transitive consciousness; it is consciousness" tou t
court" ,not consciousness ofor that anything (Armstrong &
Malcolm 3). Intransitive consciousness is consciousness
without an object. I think it is best thought of as a necessary
"background" for transitive consciousness.s That is, one
mustbe intransitively conscious, inthe sense of being "awake",
in order to be transitively conscious. Intransitive conscious
ness can be better understood by examining a misconstrual of
what it is. Armstrong says, "Suppose it is true to say of
somebody that he is seeing a horse. Normally at least, this is
an intransitive idiom" (Armstrong 117). Not at alL One sees
a horse; here we clearly have a type of consciousness
(seeing) which has an object (a horse), and hence is a form of
transitive consciousness. I am uncertain why Armstrong
would say this, given that he later claims (correctly) that
there is no intransitive perception"; presumably "He saw a
horse" as an idiom suggests a type of intransitive conscious
ness, but how it does so is entirely unclear (Armstrong 117).
Transitive consciousness presupposes intransitive con
sciousness, in the sense that to be able to say of a person that
she perceives her surroundings, has sensations, expresses
beliefs, etc., presupposes her "being awake".6 Intransitive
consciousness is not, however, a mere static state; there are
degrees of intransitive consciousness, as Searle illustrates:
/I
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If during sleep I have dreams, I become conscious,
though dream forms of consciousness in general are
of a much lower level of intensity and vividness than
ordinary waking consciousness. Consciousness can
vary in degree even during our waking hours, as for
example when we move from being wide awake and
alert to sleepy or drowsy, or simply bored and inat
tentive. Some people introduce chemical substances
into their brains for the purpose of producing altered
states of consciousness, but even without chemical
assistance, it is possible in ordinary life to distinguish
different degrees and forms of consciousness. (Searle
83)

The types of consciousness Searle is describing in the above
passage can all be understood as intransitive;7 they do not
take objects. One cannot be awake of or that anything, no
matter how alert, attentive, drowsy, or distracted one may be
in that particular state of "awakeness". By affecting the brain
with alcohol, one cannot be said to be drunk of or that an
object, fact, etc. Nevertheless, intransitive consciousness (of
whatever sort) is a necessary condition of transitive con
sciousness; it is the requisite "background" for the more
seeing, hearing, feeling emotions, thinking, and all the other
interesting things that persons do.
Consciousness and Materialism
The empirical findings so lauded by materialism seems to
provide an asymmetrical understanding of these two types
of consciousness, with intransitive consciousness enjoying
the more thorough explanation. According to the materialist,
the fact that everything can be explained physically means
that everything can be explained causally, viz., in terms of
causal physicallaws. Our sense ofintransitiveconsciousness
as a background state fits the causal model quite well. To be
/I awake" in the most basic sense, one requires a properly
functioning, oxygenated brain in a comparatively normal
biochemical state. Modifications of this biochemical state
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produce different types of intransitive consciousness. For
instance, a brain which is being affected by the chemicals
found in tranquilizers will produce a lower level" of intran
sitive consciousness (i.e., will cause a person to be drowsy);
on the other hand, a brain being flooded by endorphins
causes an intransitive state of consciousness characterized by
an overall sense of elation (though one is not, in this sense,
elated of or that anything). Different general IImoods" as
different types of intransitive consciousness such as being
ecstatic or depressed (though, to distinguish moods from
emotions (which are types of transitive consciousness), not
ecstatic or depressed of or that anything), seem quite ame
nable to causal explanation:
II

t

Moods are pervasive, they are rather simple, espe
cially because they have no essential intentionality,
and it looks like there ought even to be a biochemical
account of some moods. We already have drugs that
are used to alleviate clinical depression. (Searle 140-1)
A neurophysiological (Le., physical) explanation of the vari
ous types of intransitive consciousness seems to be a genuine
possibility, because intransitive consciousness seems to be a
largely (I will not say entirely) causal notion; one is caused to
be alert, drunk, or depressed because one's brain is well
rested, permeated by alcohol, or in some state of chemical
imbalance. Indeed, neurophysiologists have been able to
explain a great deal in this domain.
Transitive consciousness, on the other hand, has not been
nearly as well explained by neurophysiology. 8 Explanations
of remembering, believing, and other such cognitive types of
consciousness seem particularly impoverished; in particular,
explanations of how the content of particular memories and
thoughts is stored" in particular parts of the brain is highly
theoretical at best. Explanations of perception fare a bit
better, but still seem insufficient to account for such things
such as the Gestalt structure of perception in purely neuro
physiological terms. Neuroscientists readily acknowledge
1/
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the high level of theoriticity in many of their explanations,
and, for some types of consciousness, the lack of any reason
ably complete or concrete explanation. However, they tend
to dismiss these problems by invoking a future when, as a
result of continued successful empirical research, all such
difficulties will allegedly disappear.
Transitive consciousness is characterized by its having an
object. It is consciousness of or that something, which is to say
that it is consciousness directed towards an object. Hence,
transitive consciousness involves an intentional relation to its
object. 9 These intentional relations cannot be reduced to
causal relations, simply because they are two fundamentally
different sorts of relations; the essence of intentionality is its
directedness" or aboutness", while this element is not
present in causality. Therefore, transitive consciousness is
not explainable on the neurophysiologist's model of an en
tirely causal, physical system. Any appeal to future empirical
discoveries about the brain is futile, because these will only
be discoveries of causal events and relations in the brain;
intentionality, however, is not reducible to causality.
Ii

/I

Consciousness and Language

EYen if empirical discoveries allowed the neuroscientist
to establish some definite level of psycho-physical parallel
ism in cases of transitive consciousness}O it does not follow
that one can give a reductive explanation of psychological
predicates. The linguistic points made above still hold:
Persons are the bearers of psychological predicates, and it is
what persons do that constitutes the criteria for ascribing
these predicates; hence, an explanation of the psychological
must be based in language about persons and what they do,
no matter how much is known about brains and what they
do. It is clearly the case that persons bear the psychological
predicates which correspond to the various types of transi
tive consciousness. Persons see, feel and understand; brains
do not. Furthermore, it is the actions of persons that serve as
criteria for attributing the various types of transitive con
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sdousness. We say that someone believes that such-and-such
is the case because tha t person verbally affirms the belief, acts
in accordance with it; etc.; to explain that someone believes
something because his brain carries some sort of chemical
code presupposes that we have used the regular criteria of
what he says and does to determine that he does, in fact,
believe such-and-such.
Intransi tive consciousness might seem to be exempt from
this point if, as I have suggested, it can largely be understood
in terms of a causal, neurophysiological explanation. How
ever, it is still persons, not their brains, who are said to be
awake, asleep, elated, depressed, inebriated, etc.; persons are
the bearers ofthe psychological predicates which correspond
to. the various types of intransitive consciousness. Even
thoughintransitive consciousness can largely be explained in
neurophysiological/biochemical terms, such an explanation
is secondary to an explanation in terms of the persons to
whom the predicates of intransitive consciousness are as
cribed. Empirical knowledge of a certain aspect of persons,
viz., the influence of their brains on their intransitively
conscious states, cannot absolve an explanation of this aspect
from presupposing persons. As brains are no more than
parts of persons, so too is neurophysiological explanation no
more than a part of the explanation of persons.
Conclusion

The fact that persons are more than their neurophysi
ological makeup does not imply that neurophysiology is
irrelevant to an explanation of persons and what they do and
say. As we have seen, neurophysiology is particularly rel
evant in understanding and explaining intransitive con
sciousness, while it has a far lesser role in explaining transi
tive consciousness. However, a purely neurophysiological
explanation is not sufficient to explain any sort of conscious
ness, precisely because it leaves out of the explanations those
very things which are conscious, persons.u Hacker warns
that crossing the language of persons with the language of
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neurophysiology "produces a conflict of rules and hence
incoherence", but only if one attempts to reduce the "person
story" to the "brain story" (Hacker 148-9). If the "brainstory"
is viewed as no more than a supplement to the prior, basic
Ifperson story" and if stipulations of applicability are care
fully laid out, then the crossing of languages need not result
in incoherence; rather, it might lead to a more inclusive and
unitary account of persons - for whatever else they are,
persons are beings which possess brains, and these brains are
necessary for their personhood. What I have attempted to do
here is provide a basic outline for how such a project might
proceed.
f
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Notes
1. Animals can, of course, perceive things and have
sensations, but it is dubious whether or not they can engage
in more complex cognitive activities.
2. This is (admittedly) a quick rejoinder to anyone who
would assume that a Wittgensteinian approach dispenses
with the subjective aspect of personhood in favour of a
behaviorist or verificationist stance.
3. Eliminative materialists willfully deny its existence; I
can only dismiss this as absurd a philosophical position as
one could ever take.
4. Malcolm and others go on to use this distinction in
debates about the nature of introspection and self-conscious
ness. While it is true that these issues follow from the distinc
tion, my project here is to show how these concepts of
consciousness relate specifically to the materialist thesis.
S. This is notthe same as Searle's notion of Background"
(Searle 175ff.).
6. The literature seems equally divided on whether
intransitive consciousness presupposes transitive conscious
ness; I am inclined to say that it does not, although it is almost
always the case that manifestations of transitive conscious
ness constitute the criteria by which we attribute intransitive
consciousness.
7. Dreaming constitutes an exception; we dream of
things, hence it is clearly a type of transitive consciousness.
Nevertheless, I believe dreaming can be accommodated on
this model; as a sketch, I suggest that one could posit a very
low level of intransitive consciousness (" awakeness which
would facilitate the transitive consciousness of dreaming
(which itself seems to be a peculiar species of imagination).
8. I do not claim to be abreast of state-of-the-art neuro
physiology, butthis is the sense I get of the discipline's status.
9. I do not wish to identify transitive consciousness and
intentionality; there seem to be many cases of intentionality
without transitive consciousness. For example, a belief is
intentional even if one is not presently conscious of that belief.
10. The discovery that certain areas of the brain are
"modules" for certain types of transitive consciousness (es
pecially percpetion) is an example of a small step towards
such a arallelism.
II
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11. To say nothing of the Nagelian objection that a
reductive materialist account could not possibly account for
the subjective, qualitative nature of consciousness; such sub
jectivity seems to be an essential aspect of consciousness
(transitive or intransitive).

